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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann., Section 78-2a-3(2)(g), and Article VIII, Sections 3 and 4 
of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in specifically failing to find that once a 
party, the Plaintiff herein, repudiated the contract, the non-
breaching party, the Defendant herein, was relieved from performing 
and could pursue his remedies for breach of contract? 
2. Did the Court err in failing to find that once 
anticipatory repudiation has occurred, the Defendant in this matter 
was entitled to bring suit on the contract at any time within the 
statutory period of limitations? 
3. Did the trial court err in its ruling with regard to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in failing to make Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order and Judgment specifically 
reciting the facts and theories relied upon in granting summary 
judgment? 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND CASE LAW 
There are no determinative rules or case law that govern the 
disposition of this Appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to determine the enforceability of an 
agreement to purchase property and thus determine the validity of a 
Notice of Interest filed on the property in question by the 
Defendant. 
II 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff, Wilford Hooley, is approximately seventy-five 
years of age (R. 32), and recognized when his deposition was taken, 
that he was not as sharp as he used to be. (R. 33) 
The Plaintiff, in his lifetime had sold only one other parcel of 
property, a former home, to his son. (R. 33-4) 
The parcel of property involved in this matter is located at 
approximately 720 West 200 South in Lindon, Utah County, Utah and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning 7.44 chains East and 0.50 chains North of the 
Southwest Corner of Section 33, in Township 5 South, Range 
2 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in Utah County, 
State of Utah, thence North 372.24 feet; thence North 
85°52f30" East 485.5 feet; thence South 158.50 feet; 
thence South 40° West 355 feet to road; thence West 240 
feet to the place of beginning. 
Together with any and all water rights appurtenant thereto 
and together with any and all improvements thereunto 
belonging. 
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The property consists of 3.36 acres and has Cobbler Ditch 
Company water appurtenant to it. (R. 35) 
In June of 1987, the Plaintiff was living alone in a home 
located approximately a block to a block-and-a-half from the 
Defendant, Clinton Barter. (R. 39-41) 
The Plaintiff and Defendant had met working in the pipe trade 
and at the time they negotiated the transaction involving the 
property had known each other for more than eleven (11) years. (R. 
40) The Plaintiff characterized the relationship as "friendly" in 
his deposition (R. 49) 
Approximately one week prior to the agreement of June 28, 1987, 
the Plaintiff and Defendant met to discuss the possible sale of the 
Plaintiff's property. (R. 42) The meeting took place at the 
Plaintiff's residence and on the property in question. (R. 42) The 
parties discussed generally the dimensions of the property and 
general price terms. (R. 44-5) 
The parties then met two additional times during the next week 
to discuss the pending transaction. (R. 46) During those meetings, 
the Plaintiff was debating whether or not to accept the Defendant's 
offer of $20,000.00 (R. 47). 
The Plaintiff claimed that he was unsure of the value of the 
property but knew that approximately one year before the Plaintiff's 
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brother had sold one acre (located directly to the east of 
Plaintiff's property) for approximately $12,000.00. (R. 48) 
On Sunday, June 28, 1987, the Plaintiff was being visited by his 
grandson's family. (R. 50) The Defendant came to the Plaintiff's 
home and a discussion involving the property took place around the 
Plaintiff's kitchen table. (R. 51) The Plaintiff's relatives 
remained in the living room. (R. 51) 
At that meeting, the Defendant, Mr. Barter, indicated that he 
wanted to close the deal and although the Plaintiff claims he had 
some mental reservations, the Plaintiff told the Defendant he was 
willing. (R. 52) 
The agreement prepared by the Defendant was presented to the 
Plaintiff and the parties both signed the agreement. (R. 53) The 
text of the agreement is as follows: 
I, Clinton Barter, am giving Wilford Hooley $200.00 cash 
earnest money for property located at 720 West 200 South, 
Lindon, Utah, this 28th day of June, 1987. The remaining 
balance of $19,800.00 for 3.36 acres due upon completion of 
title search proving clear title to said property. 
Buyer: s/Clinton J. Barter Date: 6/28/87 
Seller: s/Wilford Hooley Date: 6/28/87 
(R. 28) 
The Plaintiff accepted, at the time of the execution of the 
Agreement, Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) earnest money. (R. 54) The 
Plaintiff conceded that the Defendant at no time was rude or 
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overbearing with the Plaintiff in the parties' negotiations or the 
signing of the agreement. (R. 54-5) 
It should be noted that during the week of negotiations, the 
Plaintiff did not attempt to call a real estate salesperson, 
appraiser or lawyer with regard to the value of the property or any 
other aspect of the transaction. (R. 56) 
After the meeting on Sunday, June 28, 1987, with the Defendant, 
the Plaintiff called his brother in Lindon, Utah and formed the 
conclusion that he had sold the property for less than its value. 
(R. 58) 
The Plaintiff on June 28, 1987 then went to the home of the 
Defendant to see if he would back out of the transaction (R. 58) and 
was informed by the Defendant that he would not. (R. 59) 
On Monday, June 29, 1987, the Plaintiff met with his attorney, 
Dallas Young. (R. 59) Mr. Dallas Young sent the Defendant a letter 
with the Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) repudiating the contract as of 
June 28, 1987. The Defendant, Mr. Barter, on July 2, 1987, returned 
Mr. Young's letter to him together with the Two Hundred Dollars 
($200.00). (Addendum 1) 
On June 29, 1987, the Defendant had his attorney, Franklin H. 
Butterfield write the Plaintiff a letter, certified mail. (Addendum 
2-3) 
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In conformity with the letter from Mr. Butterfield, the 
Defendant filed a Notice of Interest on June 29, 1987 (Addendum 4) 
and within approximately one month, had the title work done on the 
property. (Addendum 5-11) 
After the discussion between the parties on June 28, 1987, the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant had no further discussions. (R. 61) The 
Plaintiff, after talking with his brother and contacting his lawyer, 
all of which was within one day of the agreement, repudiated the 
contract and did not intend to close the transaction with the 
Defendant. (R. 63-5) 
Finally, from June 28, 1987 to the time the Plaintiff's 
deposition was taken, the Plaintiff did not undertake any further 
action to determine the value of the property. (R. 72-3) 
III 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The complaint was filed by the Plaintiff on February 2, 1989 (R. 
1-3). The Answer, Counterclaim and Notice of the Plaintiff's 
Deposition were all filed on March 9, 1989. (R. 5-12) 
The Reply of the Counterclaim was filed by the Plaintiff on 
April 10, 1989. (R. 13-16) An Amended Notice of Deposition was 
filed by the Defendant for the Plaintiff's deposition on April 14, 
1989. (R. 17-18) 
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Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with accompanying 
Memorandum on November 9, 1989. (R. 19-90) Defendant filed a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment on November 22, 1989. (R. 91-101) 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding entered his Memorandum Decision on 
the Motion for Summary Judgment on January 2, 1990 granting 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-106) 
Defendant filed a Motion to Amend the Findings with accompanying 
memoranda on February 2, 1990. (R. 114-118) The Plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to Amend Findings with 
accompanying memoranda on January 16, 1990. (R. 110-112) 
The Court entered its Memorandum Decision on the Defendant's 
Motion to Amend the Findings on February 5, 1990. By said Memorandum 
Decision, the Court denied the Motion to Amend the Findings filed by 
the Defendant. (R. 119) 
The Court signed an Order prepared by counsel for the Plaintiff 
on February 9, 1990 adjudicating the Agreement of June 28, 1987 as 
unenforceable and of no further force and effect and further 
adjudicating the Notice of Interest filed by the Defendant in this 
matter as an unenforceable interest. Finally, the Order prepared by 
Plaintiff's counsel quieted title in the subject property in the 
Plaintiff, free and clear of any claim of the Defendant. (R. 121-22) 
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Notice of Appeal was filed by the Defendant on March 9, 1990. 
(R. 123-124) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in specifically failing to find that once a 
party, the Plaintiff herein, repudiated the contract, the non-
breaching party, the Defendant herein, was relieved from performing 
and could pursue his remedies for breach of contract. 
2. The Court erred in failing to find that once anticipatory 
repudiation has occurred, the Defendant in this matter was entitled 
to bring suit on the contract at any time within the statutory period 
of limitations. 
3. The trial court erred in its ruling with regard to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in failing to make Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order and Judgment specifically 
reciting the facts relied upon in granting summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT REPUDIATED THE CONTRACT 
WITH THE PLAINTIFF 
The Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation of a contract is 
accepted in nearly all American jurisdictions: 
According to the general view prevailing now in nearly all 
American jurisdictions, where there has been an 
anticipatory breach of a contract by one party thereto, the 
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other party may treat the entire contract as broken and may 
sue immediately for the breach. An anticipatory breach of 
contract is one committed before the time has come when 
there is a present duty of performance, and is the outcome 
of words of acts evincing an intention to refute 
performance in the future. Such a breach precedes the time 
prescribed for performance, or at least the time when 
tender performance has been proffered. . . . . (emphasis 
added). 
17 Am.Jur. 2d, Contracts, Section 44, pp. 910-11. 
The Restatement provides as follows; 
Generally, a party acts at his peril if, insisting on what 
he mistakenly believes to be his rights, he refuses to 
perform his duty. His statement is a repudiation if the 
threatened breach would, without more, have given the 
injured party a claim for damages for total breach. 
II Restatement (2d) of Contracts, Section 250, Comment (d) at 274 
(1981). 
Lastly, as expressed by Corbin: 
If one party to a contract, either wilfully or by mistake, 
demands of the other a performance to which he has no right 
under the contract and states definitely that, unless his 
demand is complied with, he will not render his promised 
performance, an anticipatory breach has been committed. 
Such a repudiation is conditional in character, it is true, 
but the condition is a performance to which the repudiator 
has no right. . . 
Where the two contracting parties differ as to the 
interpretation of the contract or as to its legal effects, 
an offer to perform in accordance with his own 
interpretation made by one of the parties is not in itself 
an anticipatory breach. In order to constitute such a 
breach, the offer must be accompanied by clear 
manifestation of intention not to perform in accordance 
with any other interpretation. 
4 Corbin on Contracts, Section 973 at 910-11 (1951). 
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As applied to the facts of this case, there is no doubt that the 
Plaintiff-Respondent repudiated the contract* The repudiation is 
well documented in the Plaintiff's deposition, as set forth in the 
Statement of Facts* Within one day of the date he signed the 
Agreement with the Defendant, the Plaintiff hired an attorney and 
employed him to send a letter dated June 29, 1987 returning the 
$200.00 earnest money and repudiating the contract. (R. 59-60) 
The Plaintiff further indicated in response to the question as 
to whether or not he would have responded to any request to close the 
transaction, that he would not. (R. 64-65) 
The issue as to whether or not the actions of the Plaintiff and 
the letter written by Plaintiff's counsel constitutes an 
anticipatory repudiation is moot. In the Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff states as 
follows: 
The next day after signing the agreement, Hooley expressed 
to Barter his desire to repudiate the contract and return 
to Barter's attorney (Butterfield) the $200.00 earnest 
money. 
(R. 23) 
As one reads the deposition of the Plaintiff-Respondent Wilford 
Hooley (R. 30-87), there leaves no question that within a day after 
the signing the agreement with the Defendant, that the Plaintiff 
personally went to the Defendant and through his attorney repudiated 
the contract. 
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POINT II 
UTAH COURTS HAVE LONG RECOGNIZED THE DOCTRINE OF 
ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION 
The recognition in Utah of the Doctrine of Anticipatory 
Repudiation is documented in University Club v. Invesco, 29 Utah 2d 
1, 504 P.2d (Utah 1972). In that case, University Club, Inc. sued 
its landlord, Invesco, Inc., to recover approximately $30,000 in 
damages incurred because of the failure of an air conditioning 
system. The lease expressly provided that the lessor (Invesco) would 
furnish adequate air conditioning and keep it in repair. On 
approximately July 18, 1969, the system failed. After requesting 
Invesco to correct the situation, University Club proceeded to 
purchase an auxiliary air conditioning system. 
Invesco relied upon a clause in the lease agreement which 
provided that only if lessor (Invesco), failed to make any repairs 
for a period of 30 days after written demand, could the lessor be 
held in default. Plaintiff, University Club, countered with proof 
that it had served written demand for performance on the defendant 
and had been informed by the defendant's manager that it would take 
two to three months before the air conditioning system could be 
replaced. The Court, on appeal, stated as follows: 
The recognized rule is where one party definitely indicates 
that he cannot or will not perform a condition of a 
contract, the other is not required to uselessly abide 
time, but may act upon the breached condition. Indeed, in 
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appropriate circumstances, he ought to do so to mitigate 
damages. 
Id. at 30. 
The Supreme Court had a chance to set forth the parameters of 
the rule in Stanford Petroleum Co. v. Janssen, 209 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1949). In that action, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover 
$1,000 paid to the defendant Janssen. Defendant counterclaimed for 
specific performance of a contract involving an assignment of an oil 
lease. The Court, in discussing the issues stated as follows: 
The rule governing this phase of the appeal is stated in 
Restatement of the Lav/, Contracts 1 A.L.I., Section 306, 
which reads as follows: "where failure of the party to a 
contract to perform a condition or a promise is induced by 
a manifestation to him by the other party that he cannot or 
will not substantially perform his own promise or that he 
doubts whether though able he will do so, the duty of such 
other party becomes independent of performance of the 
condition or promise. He has power to nullify his 
manifestation of unwillingness or inability by retracting 
it, so long as the former party, in reliance thereon, has 
not changed his position.", (a) following such rule reads 
as follows: a. No man is compelled to do a useless act, 
and if performance of a condition will not be performed by 
performance of the promise which is conditional, it is 
useless for the intended purpose and it is therefore 
unnecessary to perform the condition. A promisee in 
judging whether performance of the condition will not be 
followed by performance of the promise is justified in 
taking the other party at his word. . . . 
Id. at 936. 
In one of the earlier statements on the subject, the Supreme 
Court again adopted the doctrine in Jordan v. Madsen, 252 P. 570 
(Utah 1926). The Court stated as follows: 
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It, of course, is well settled that a renunciation or 
repudiation of the contract by one party before the time fixed 
for performance constitutes a breach and gives an immediate 
right of action to the adverse party. [citing secondary 
sources] It also is well settled that if one of the parties to 
a contract notifies the other that he will not perform unless 
such other assents to a material modification of the contract, 
or by the addition of new terms, such conduct amounts to a 
renunciation of the contract [citing secondary sources]. 
Id. at 573. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN FAILING TO FIND 
AN ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION BY THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
In Judge Ray M. Harding's Memorandum Decision dated January 2, 
1990, the trial court stated as follows: 
The court, having considered Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, will grant that Motion finding that the 
Defendant, after agreeing to take responsibility for 
completion of the contract, did not do so within a 
reasonable period of time. Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 
P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980), Commercial Security Bank of Ogden 
v. Johnson, 173 P.2d 277 (Utah 1946). Defendant has given 
the Court no reason to excuse the delay in completing this 
transaction. An unexplained delay of 19 months is not a 
reasonable time. The Court will therefore order 
defendant's notice of interest removed and will hold the 
earnest money agreement to be unenforceable. 
Counsel for the plaintiff to prepare an order consistent 
with the terms of this decision and submit to opposing 
counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the 
Court for signature. 
(R. 105) 
Defendant-Appellant respectfully claims that the trial court 
erred in its analysis of the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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First, the Curt failed to make any finding as it relates to the 
Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, and secondly, failed to make 
any finding as to the impact of a repudiation on the Defendant-
Appellant's responsibility to go forward with his obligations under 
the terms of the contract. 
If one reviews the documents submitted to the trial court 
relative to the Motion for Summary Judgment, almost the entire 
response of the Defendant-Appellant went to the issue of the 
anticipatory repudiation and its implication in the matter. (R. 91-
101) 
Despite the fact that the Defendant-Appellant submitted to the 
Court the rationale and authority for the doctrine relating to 
anticipatory repudiation, the Court did not mention the same in its 
Memorandum Decision of January 2, 1990. (R. 105) Instead, the Court 
relied upon two cases for the doctrine of reasonable time to complete 
one's obligations under a contract. It is respectfully submitted 
that neither case is on point with regard to the issues in this 
matter. 
In Bradford, supra, the plaintiffs brought suit against the 
defendant seeking specific performance or damages for breach of an 
earnest money agreement to convey the home to the plaintiff. On 
February 17, 1978, the plaintiffs made an offer to purchase the home 
from the defendants using the standard earnest money receipt and 
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offer to purchase. The offer was conditioned by the clause "Sale 
subject to buyer obtaining financing (FHA)." On February 22, 1978, 
the defendants accepted the plaintiff's offer. Although visiting a 
financial institution, the plaintiffs did not file an application for 
a loan. In March 1979, the defendants conveyed their interest in the 
subdivision to another entity. A representative of the successor 
company informed the plaintiffs that because they had failed to 
obtain financing within a reasonable time, the company would not 
honor the earnest money agreement. Finally, in July 1979, the 
plaintiffs submitted a "loan commitment" from a financial 
institution. In discussing the issue, the Supreme Court found that 
inasmuch as the plaintiffs were seeking equitable relief, it was 
their burden to discharge their own obligations and that they did not 
do so in a reasonable period of time. Id. at 1242. There is 
absolutely no discussion in Bradford, supra relating to the Doctrine 
of Anticipatory Repudiation and its effect upon the duties of the 
non-breaching party. 
The second case cited by Judge Harding was Commercial Security 
Bank of Ogden v. Johnson, supra. In that 1946 decision, the court 
again simply dealt with the issue of reasonable time and defines it 
as: 
The contract did not specify the time in which the plant 
was to be constructed and put into operation. The law 
implies (as all parties agree) that the plant was to be 
constructed and put into operation within a reasonable 
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time. A "reasonable time" has been defined as: "so much 
time as *is necessary, under the circumstances, to do 
conveniently what the contract or duty require should be 
done in a particular case." [Citing cases] 
So much time as is necessary, for a reasonably prudent and 
diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contractor duty 
requires should be done, having a regard for the rights and 
possibility of loss, if any, to the other party to be 
affected. 
Id. at 280-81. 
In essence, the trial court avoided ruling upon the issue of 
anticipatory repudiation which, Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully 
submits is documented by both parties in this action. It is 
respectfully submitted that the Court's failure, to review the issue 
of the Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation and rule on the same, 
with sufficient detail to give the Court on Appeals an outline of the 
mental process constitutes reversible error. 
POINT IV 
ONCE AN ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION HAS OCCURRED, 
THE NON-BREACHING PARTY IS THEREAFTER RELIEVED FROM 
ANY FURTHER OBLIGATION OF PERFORMANCE AND HAS A RIGHT TO 
BRING SUIT FOR THE BREACH 
The Arizona Court in United California Bank v. Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America, 681 P.2d 390, 430 (Ariz. App. 1983) stated 
as follows: 
An anticipatory repudiation is a breach of contract giving 
rise to a claim for damages and also excusing the necessity 
for the non-breaching party to tender performance. 
(citations omitted). A repudiating party is not entitled 
to demand performance from the innocent party or use the 
latterfs failure to tender as a defense as to the claimant. 
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As stated another way, tender is excused where a party 
indicates that it will not be accepted because the law does 
not require the non-breaching party to do a futile or 
useless act. (citations omitted). Thus, to recover 
damages for anticipatory breach, the injured party need 
only show that he had the ability to perform his own 
obligation under the agreement. (Citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
United Cal Bank at 435-36. 
The authors of one secondary source specifically stated the 
application of the Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation on the non-
breaching parties duty to respond as follows: 
Nearly all the courts considering the question have reached 
the conclusion that a renunciation or repudiation of a 
contract before the time for performance, which amounts to 
a refusal to perform it at any time, gives the adverse 
party the option to treat the entire contract as broken and 
to sue immediately for damages as for a total breach. 
There is no necessity in such case for a tender of 
performance, or compliance with conditions precedent, or 
waiting for the time of performance to arrive, although 
this is optional. 
17 Am.Jur 2d Contracts, Sec. 449. 
There is no question in this case on the same day the contract 
was signed and the day after, Mr. Hooley, the Plaintiff herein 
repudiated the contract. The case law and secondary sources are 
clear, that once the repudiation has occurred, he has no further duty 
to go forward. Mr. Barter filed a Notice of Interest on the property 
(Addendum 4) and in fact within thirty days completed a title search 
(Addendum 5-11). The assertion in the lower court that because Mr. 
Barter, the Defendant herein did not have any further contact with 
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the Plaintiff, he was barred from pursuing the purchase of the 
property is totally contrary to the authorities cited above. The 
fact that there was no further communication between the Plaintiff 
and Defendant after the repudiation of the contract, is simply 
evidence that the Plaintiff-Respondent never withdrew his 
repudiation. It is respectfully submitted that the facts of this 
case as submitted for determination for the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment clearly indicate that upon the determination of 
anticipatory repudiation, Mr. Barter had no further obligation to go 
forward. 
POINT V 
ONCE THE ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION OCCURRED, DEFENDANT 
WAS ENTITLED TO BRING SUIT AT ANY TIME WITHIN 
THE STATUTORY PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-23 (1985 as amended) states: 
Within six years: (2) an action upon any contract, 
obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
Section 78-12-22 grants an eight-year statutory period of 
limitations. In any event, the non-breaching party to a contract is 
entitled to bring the suit within six years. The Plaintiff was 
advised by the letter from Butterfield of Defendant's intent the day 
they were informed of the repudiation of the contract. Ruling on the 
Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Amend the Findings which again urged 
the Court to review the issue of anticipatory repudiation, Judge 
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Harding ruled as follows on February 5, 1990, and in doing so stated 
as follows: 
The Court, having received Defendant's Motion to Amend 
Findings will deny that Motion as there are no findings in 
existence in this matter. It is not material whether there 
was an anticipatory repudiation of this contract because 
the alleged repudiation was not in writing, and Plaintiff's 
time for performance had not yet arrived. Defendant had 
the obligation to pursue completion of the contract, and 
the Court has ruled that he did not do so within a 
reasonable time period. 
(R. 119) 
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Harding erred with 
regard to the application of pursuing the action for specific 
performance. The sentence of Judge Harding's Decision that indicates 
that it is not material whether there was an anticipatory repudiation 
of the contract because the alleged repudiation was not in writing, 
is clearly error. There is nothing in Utah case law, the secondary 
sources or otherwise that requires the repudiation to be in writing. 
As indicated at the outset of this Brief, all that is necessary is a 
statement repudiating a party's intent to go forward with his 
obligations under the contract. There is absolutely no authority, 
known to the Defendant-Appellant that requires the repudiation to be 
in writing. However, even Plaintiff agrees that the letter from 
Plaintiff's counsel on June 29, 1987 constituted a repudiation. (R. 
23) Further, the statement in Judge Harding's Decision that because 
Plaintiff's time for performance had not arrived, that the doctrine 
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was inapplicable. The statement is a contradiction. The Doctrine of 
Anticipatory Repudiation expressly applies, as heretofore set out, to 
a situation where a party repudiates his obligation to go forward 
under the terms of the contract before his time to perform has 
arrived under the contract. Finally, the Ruling as it relates to 
"reasonable time" is inappropriate inasmuch as performance by Mr. 
Barter was excused by the Plaintiff's anticipatory repudiation of the 
contract. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS 
RELATIVE TO THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION 
The standard with regard to the granting of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment was set out by the Court in Frisbee v. K & K Construction 
Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984). The court stated as follows: 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that summary judgment is proper only where there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It should be 
granted only where it clearly appears that there is no 
reasonable probability that the party moved against could 
prevail. As this court explained the standard: 
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. If there is any doubt or 
uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing 
party. Thus, the court must evaluate all the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly 
drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing summary judgment. 
20 
Id. at 389. See also Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982); Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 
1983). 
In this case, it is respectfully submitted that the evidence is 
clear and convincing that the Plaintiff repudiated the contract in 
this matter. It is upon that basis that the Defendant-Appellant 
requests that the matter be reversed for entry of judgment on that 
issue in favor of the Defendant. However, certainly there is no way 
that the deposition of Mr. Hooley, the Plaintiff herein, can be read 
to support the proposition that there is no issue of fact as it 
relates to his repudiation. The Court simply failed to make any 
specific findings as to the issue of repudiation and the conduct of 
the parties and based thereon, the case law interpreting Rule 56 
mandates that the case be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the 
Court should reverse the Memorandum Decisions and Orders of Judge 
Harding in this matter. It is respectfully submitted that the 
evidence is uncontroverted as to the issue of anticipatory 
repudiation and therefore, the Court should find, as a matter of law, 
that the Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation applies in this matter, 
and that in fact the Plaintiff-Respondent did repudiate the contract, 
thus, leaving for determination at trial the issue as to the 
21 
implementation of the specific performance requested by the Defendant 
and rulings on tUte other relief requested by the Defendant-Appellant 
in his Counterclaim. 
DATED this l5 clay of September, 1990. 
MICHAEL K. BLACK, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUMS 
On J u l y 2 , 1987 a t 2 : V p . r n , . - r .»or B a r t e r b r o a c h ' -- t - . 
o f f i c e of Da 1 1 a s - v i u i \ ^~^ - r - \M v h ^ - V - ' s i ^ c r e t a t y 
a i r I g I i I a 3 ] e 11 e H I I «l n * - _ 
Barter Enclosed in the le:ier from. Mr. Young to Mr » Bart.::, and 
returned I: :: tl: :te • ::  f f ,:i c e :: f I :.:: ! ! c: i n :tg • ::  j :i • Ji :i]| ;; , 2 3 9 8 '3 vs c .s ::.: r si n i i 
o f S.2 00 . 00 , II! i:i : 1 oung was Dt in tl le office at the time c : the 
delivery on July 2, 19 87. 
Merle Nyman -7T^-
FEANKUNH.BUTTEEF1EI 
KOWftMtOC 
June t9# 1967 
IT. Vilford Boolay 
klX W*st, >700 Hearth, 
FTOYO, Utah 6U6UI4 
Dear Sirt 
Mr. Clinton Barter hks jast thie day consulted thia 
office relative to an Ernest honey igreement he signed vitn you 
for the purchasa of real aatata in lindon, Utah, aaid agreenent 
i s in writing, add there ia consideration passing firoa Buyer to 
S*Her. l e has f i led a Notice of late re rt in the aubject property 
ana i s arranging a t i t l e aesrch on ?&e property* 
V^en that la done he *£Z1 aet vp an ^pointaent with 
a t i t l e company to close the traneartioru 
Z have assured him tnat oe has complied vith a l l rafuire&emai 
of Utah lav for t&e purchasa of ret* property, and that ahould you now 
decide not to eeU tfce eubJect property for the prioe*e contained 
In tne agreement* t b n Ha fcaa a aensorloua oauae of action far 
Specific performance of a contract far the purchase of property. 
I trust that this wi l l xot be necessary, and tnat your 
attendance at the closing trill be forthcoming. 
fery truly yours, 
P H BUTTffiFULD./ 
P-xa? T72 323 
P-l ' PO^ CERTIFIED :VA!L 
/ /2 "1. 
0 SENDER: Complete items 1 and 2 «rtan additional services are oeskad,afid complete hams 3 and 4 
the reverse sloe. M h n a to do this will piavent this 
He wilt provide you the name of the parson 1 
- thafolkaeiigasfiioasareeeeilehai cSnautt \ 
Put your address in the "RETURN 
card from being rvturned to you, 
delivered to and the date of 
postmaster for seas and check 
1 . O Shim to whom 
3.Artidt 
Registered 
c*rm*t 
f L I Express Mail 
- —***—J— 
^73~?* 5 
B Insured COD 
Always obtain signature of addressee or 
•Oertf end DATE DELIVERED. 
8. Addressee's Address (ONL Y if 
requested and fee pmd) 
7. Date of Delivery 
H Form 3811. Feb* 1986 DOMESTIC RETURN RECEIPT 
- 3 -
NOTICE Of ^IfBtESf jOT TtEAI TROFSSn 
) 125L11* » 10i3* Aft FEE-, 3J$i 
COUKTT OF UTAH ) RECORDBJ FOR CLIKTOK J BARTER 
TO VH3K I T MAT CONCERN 
Rot ice i s hereby g-./en that the undersigned has an interest in c e r t a i n real 
property s t i u a t e d i n Ut*a County, State of Utah, described a* follows* 
BEGINNING 7.44 CHADS EAST AND 0.50 CHAINS NORM OF 
THE SOUTHWEST CORNER CF SECTION 33 , IN TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, 
.RANGE 2 EAST OF THE SAIT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, IN UTAH 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THENCE NORTH 372.24 FEET, THENCE 
NCRIH 85 NEGREES 52 ME50TES 30 SECONDS EAST 485 .5 FEET, 
THENCE SOUTH 158.50 FET, THENCE SOOTH 40 DEGREES WEST 
i$55&EET TO ROAD, THEtCE WEST 240 FEET TO THE PLACE OF 
BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH ANY AND 2IL WATER RIGHTS APPURTENANT THEREUNn, AND 
TOGETHER WITH ANY AID III, TIPROVEMENTS THEREUNTO BELONGING. 
S a i d i n t e r e s t i s evidenced by a c e r t a i n EARNEST MONET SALES AGREEMENT 
dated 28 JUNE 19E~ ,\j and between VTILFjRD L. HOOLEY, TRUSTEE 
( l e l l e r ) 
CF g g ygTLFOHD L. HOCLZZ FAMILY TRUST s o S e l l e r s and the undersigned a s Buyers, 
( s e l l e r . ) 
CLINTON J . B A F i & y " ) * * ^ 
Subscribed and sworn tc oefore me t h i s 29 day of JUKE A.D., 19 87 
* * « & 
„ v . . . ' I / V 
Residing at PVTMVZ. , V^TyVrt 
My Connnission Expires fc> *~ ( — 9 0 
Prepared for: 
CLINTOL ^ I V l i J l V 
SCHEt LI II I- \ 
? Policy orP ' j i ' ce ~ be issued: £ 
(a) • ALTA Ovi-s-s pol icy— For- — -.r73 S T B y 
F-"oposec -sured: 
CLINTON J , BARTER 
(b) r- ALTA Stc* :ard Loan Policy. Coverage —1970 $ 
F I D E L : ^ -ITLE 
375-62 H; 
P r 0 | . u ") c *-•"' r i i r p f l 
IJ t-'sUie oi i! 'V in im.' lar.f* described or refs-ed to in this Commitment and covered he -T - is: 
• PEL 
1" ;^ e to said esta • or interest ir sa : a- ' s a< the e'-'ecuve date hereof vested in: 
WILFORD _ .___isx AND ZRI.IVi )\ "OOLEY, TRUSTEES III Mil IIILJ.KD 
iOOLEY FAMILY TRUST 
Tnf- viii'- re*erre' • •" rrns C-'virr tment is locatec -. the County of UTAH 
State o- and describe: as follows: 
BEGINNING ,44 CHAINS EAST AND C.50 CHAINS NORTH OF THE SOUnHWEST 
CORNER OF SECTION 3 3 , IN TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 2 EAST : ? THE 
SALT LAKE 3ASE AND MERIDIAN, IN UTAH COUNTY, STATE 0 1 UTAH, 
THENCE NORTH 3 7 2 . 2 4 F E E T ; THENCE NORTH 8 5 DEGREES 5 2 ' 32' EAST 
4 8 5 . 5 FEET- THENCE SOUTH 1 5 8 . 5 3 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 4 0 DI^REES 
WEST 3 5 5 FEET TO ROAD? THENCE WEST 2 4 0 FEET TO THE PL.f.IE OF 
BEGINNING. 
NOTE: LEGAL DOES NOT CLOSE 
PROPERTY AT'I iRESS: 7;'fl WEST ,'i.lu SOUTH, l . I N D O N , UTAH H4t .n i / 
SCHEDULE B-I 
I. The following are the requirements to be complied with: 
1. Instruments necessary to create the estate or interest to be rsured must be properly executed, 
delivered and duly filed for record. 
2. Payment of the consideration for the estate or interest to be h^red. 
3. Payment of all taxes, charges, assessments, levied and assess*:: against subject premises, which 
are due and payat'e. 
4. Satisfactory eviderce should be had that improvements and/o 'epa'ns or alterations thereto are 
completed; that contractor, subcontractors, labor and materialmen =re all paid. 
5. PROVIDE SURVEY DESCRIPTION OF SUBJECT PROPERTY DISCLOSING 
FENCE LINES AND DEED LINES. 
6. RELEASE JUDGMENT OR PROVIDE NEW PRDPOSEI OWNER INSURED. 
• ?lT>rvi * 
i to the following matte-i unless the 
.. ^ - ^ ^ ^ - ^ - — •-. * - u ^ will contain exceptions 
w m « at* * tmpoMd«tiothe aaHataction of ^ Company. 
1. Defect., tens, aocumbranca.. advers* claims or other matters, if any created, first appt; 
public racortJs or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but pnor to the a? 
posed Insured acquires for value of -ecord'the estate or interest or mortgage thereor 
this Commitment. 
"Jaims of ?af 
otr.e- D*" 
• ? -• coss-
ets in bou-
ndary or I: 
5. 
li^es. shortage 
on disputes 
3.T-rar or unct 
• , 3 t . ' I i ' n u l l s lii 
'-- Dub'ic r'ecorc'i 
i area e^c r :3:: , , r r ,?n*s c^r\z: 
i i i • 
A '". , 0 • S e ' ' - p 
pro demerits 
Any roadway or ease~e^r s m 'a< 
thereof not shown Dy the public re: 
Any liens for labor, services, or r 
records. 
6 Any titles or rights asserted by any: 
ments, or other entities, to tidela-
streams, lakes, bays, oceans, or gu u 
lished or changed by the United Sta ~i Government or riparian rights if 
'" Any unpatented mining claims; rest -
suance thereof; water rights, c la im 
8. Community property, dov.er. courte: 
9. The lien of all taxes and assessme" 
10 Restrictive covenants a " r : t : - g the : 
1 1 . TAXES FOR 1 9 8 " WKIC:-
PAYABLE.. TAXES FOR 1 9 8 6 HA 
D - 1 2 2 8 - B IN THE AMOUNT OF 
LAND EVALUATION OF $ 3 7 , 5 8 5 .00 WITH IMPROVEMENTS OF 
THEREON. 
rrz^^n. 
shown 
ncluding. but not limited to, parsers coroora* 
or lands comprising the shores : oovems 
lands beyond.the line of the harbc- ?r bulkhea-
r :ons 0! exceptions in patents or ~ a;-^ -
i • titles to wain . 
:' homestead rights, if any. of any socuse . 
:r the year 19 . .g-y, and thereafter. 
• :erty above riesr ibed 
ARF ACCRUING BUT N "T YE 
."£ BEEN PAID UNDER TAX SERJ 
r ng in the 
~e the pro-
revered by 
-g of im-
any part 
*e public 
povern-
----gabie 
- estab-
is-
: 5 0 5 . 9 6 . SAID AMOUNT WAS P. r n : : - ON -
1 3 5 . 0 2 
1 2 . SUBJECT TO ANY AND AL 
CITY r:-F LTNDON, LIN DON CI""" 
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS LEVIED IY THE 
REPORTS NONE. 
1 3 , SUBJECT TO A 9 ^ 4 .r VT OVERLAP ON THE NORTHEAST TURNER 
DECREASING TO A 6 . 4 6 6 FOOT :-AP THEN INCREASING TO A 36*46<T 
OVERLAP AT THE 'SOUTHEAST CCPSER. 
1 4 * --.-DECREE OF ANNULMENT LATED 0 8 JANUARY 1 9 8 1 EXECUTE! 
BETWEEN KAREN BARTER, AS PLAINTIFF AND CLINTON BART: 
DEFENDANT/ UNDER CIVIL NO. £3934 , RECORDED 0 8 JANUARY 1 9 8 ] 
OFFICIAL RECORDS, MORE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
" E 
THE DEFENDANT 1? 
AMOUNT OF $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 
THEREFOR. 
ARREA"? IN CHILD SUPPORT PAY* EN . ^ . , THE 
' THAT "'HE P L A I N T I F F SHALL HAVE A JUIGMENT 
1 5 . SECOND AMENDED DECEIT OF ANNULMENT DATED 06 ^ . 
EXECUTED BY AND BETWEEN KA?.2N BARTER, AS P L A I N T I F F AND C 
BARTER, AS DEFENDANT, UNDER ZIVIL NO. 5 3 9 3 4 , RECORDED P* w 
IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS. 
; 9 8 i 
IN TON 
• ^81 
16. JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT IVTED 25 JUNE 1982 EXECUlbu r: ^MFAC 
DISTRIBUTION CORPORATION DBA AMFAC MECHANICAL SUPPLY COMF'OY, AS 
PLAINTIFF, AGAINST CLINTON BARTER DBA C.B. *'iUMBI*3f AS 
DEFENDANT, UNDER CIVIL NO. 60419, IN THE AMOUNT OF $6,-18.33, 
TOGETHER WITH ATTORNEY'S FIZS IN THE SUM OF ?1, 200.00, RETORDED 
19P- IN THE OFFICII RECORDS* 
- 7 -
1 7 . WARRANT FIR DELINQUENT TAX DATED 0 1 NOVEMBER 1 9 8 2 EXECUTED 
BY AND I N FAVI? OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSI'. ' .- OF UTAH, AGAINST 
CLINTON J . BARTER AND D. B. PLUMBING, I N THE AMOUNT OF $ 1 0 3 . 7 1 , 
UNDER DOCKET J:D. A - 3 7 - 4 4 8 , RECORDED 0 3 NC"ZMBER 1 9 8 2 IN THE 
O F F I C I A L RECOF.IS. 
1 8 . WARRANT FIR DELINQUENT TAX DATED 0 1 NC TMBER 1 9 8 2 EXECUTED 
BY AND IN FAYI- OF THE STATE TAX C O M M I S S I ' . : OF UTAH, AGAINST 
CLINTON J . BAP7ZR AND D. B . PLUMBING, IN TKI AMOUNT OF $ 1 0 6 . 0 5 , 
UNDER DOCKET : I . A - 3 7 - 4 4 9 , RECORDED 0 3 NI ZMBER 1 9 8 2 IN THE 
OFFICIAL RECOF.I3. 
1 9 . ORDER DATED 2 1 APRIL 1 9 8 3 EXECUTED EV AND BETWEEN KAREN 
BARTER, AS P L - I N T I F F AND CLINTON BARTER, '• :" DEFENDANT, UNDER 
C I V I L NO. 5 3 9 1 - RECORDED 0 6 MAY 1 9 8 1 IN T-1 O F F I C I A L RECORDS, 
MORE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
THAT JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE P l - I N T I F F AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT FOR I ELINQUENT CHILD SUPPORT AS '.' APRIL 1 5 , 1 9 8 3 I N 
THE SUM OF $ 1 , i*0.00. 
JUDGMENT I S ENTERED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN FAVOR OF THE 
P L A I N T I F F , FC- A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FIE FOR THE USE AND 
BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IN THE SUM 07 3 1 5 0 . 0 0 , PLUS COURT 
COST I N THE S I " OF $ 2 . 5 0 . 
2 0 . ORDER DATED 2 8 AUGUST 1 9 8 5 EXECUTED E . AND BETWEEN KAREN 
BARTER, AS PLAINTIFF AND CLINTON BARTER, >..= DEFENDANT, UNDER 
C I V I L NO. 5 3 9 3 ^ RECORDED 20 AUGUST 1 9 8 5 IN TEE OFFICIAL RECORDS. 
A. THAT DEFENDANT I S DELINQUENT IN THE PAYHIIT OF CHILD SUPPORT 
TO AND INCLUIIN'G AUGUST 3 1 I N THE SUM CI $ 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . COURT 
FURTHER -F-I-NDS-^SAT-WITH REGARD TO THE -J-UDGME-!" -PREVIOUSLY ENTERED 
IN THE AMOUNT !7 $ 1 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 THAT $ 3 0 0 . 0 0 OF S - I I JUDGMENT HAS BEEN 
P A I D . DEFENDANT HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE 7RI0R ORDER OF THE 
COURT WITH THE PAYMENT, THEREFORE PLAINTIFF IS ALLOWED TO PURSUE 
EXECUTION ON T-IVT JUDGMENT. 
B. COURT FINE.- THAT THE SUM OF $ 2 0 0 . 0 0 I S 7IAS0NABLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND ENTEF.5 JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR SAID SUM. THE 
COURT FURTHEF ENTERS JUDGMENT IN THE SUM 17 $ 1 7 . 7 5 FOR COURT 
COSTS FOR THIS PROCEEDING. 
C. COURT FINE 5 THAT THERE HAS BEEN ENTERED 1.' THE CIRCUIT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, 7-OVO DEPARTMENT, A JUDGMENT AI.AINST THE PLAINTIFF 
I N FAVOR OF : = : H O S P I T A L S , I N C . , IN THE S . ! OF $ 1 , 0 8 1 . 5 7 FOR 
MEDICAL EXPEKrZS RELATING TO THE CARE OF THE P A R T I E S ' MINOR 
CHILD. THE C0.7.T THEREFORE ORDERS PURSUANT TEE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
THAT JUDGMENT IE ENTERED AGAINST THE DEFEKI \NT FOR ONE-HALF OF 
SAID SUM WHICI-: IS THE AMOUNT OF $ 5 4 0 . 7 8 . 
2 1 . WARRANT FIR DELINQUENT TAX DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1 9 8 6 EXECUTED 
BY AND IN FAY! 7. OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSI: .-! OF UTAH, AGAINST 
CLINTON BARTEI, IN THE AMOUNT OF $ 6 9 3 . 7 6 , UNIER DOCKET NO. S T - 8 6 ^ 
2 5 9 5 , RECORDEI 24 SEPTEMBER 1 9 8 6 IN THE OFFIIIAL RECORDS. Q P\ 
2 1, BOUNDARY AGREEMENT DA^JD J ? JANUARY 1 9 8 7 F X E C U T F D AND 
BETWEEN THE WILFORD L. HOOLE FAMILY TRUST AND L O I S J . WILI ~^SON, 
RECORDED 2 0 JANUARY 1 9 8 7 AS ? I T R Y NO. 2 2 5 8 TN p n i K ? 1 " 7 An ">AGF 
5 7 0 CF THF O F F I C I A L RECORDS, 
Q 
t • -» r i ii T ^\T^^^m 
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VENDITIONS AND STIPUI M I IMIV 
1 . The term "mortgage/* when used herein, shal nclude deed of trust, trust deed, or other see* irity instn iment. 
2. If the proposed Insured' has or acquires actus knowledge of any defect, lien,, encumbrance, adverse claim 
or other matter affecting the estate or interer or mortgage thereon covered' by this Commitment other 
than those shown in Schedule B hereof, an: shall fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in 
writing, the Company shall be relieved frorr liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of 
reliance hereon to the extent the Company is arejudiced by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If the 
proposed Insured shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if the Company otherwise acquires 
actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter, the Company at 
its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall not relieve 
the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions and Stipulations 
3. Liability of the Company undei this Commttrrent shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such 
parties included under the definition of Insure! in the form of policy or policies committed for and only 
for actual loss incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements 
hereof, or (b) to eliminate exceptions shown r Schedule B, or (c) to acquire or create the estate or interest 
or mortgage thereon covered by this Commttrrent. In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated 
in Schedule A for the policy or policies commrred for and such liability is subject to the insuring provisions, 
the Conditions and Stipulations, and the Excluscns from Coverage of the form of policy or policies committed 
for in favor of the proposed Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made i pan 
of this Commitment except as expressly modmsi herein 
4 Any action or actions or rights of action thar t ie proposed Insured may have or may bring against the 
Company arising out of the status of the title ts the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon 
covered by this Commitment must be based on and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment. 
